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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoURTs-MARTIAL-PowER OF CONGRESS To
PROVIDE FOR MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS-Defendants, civilian wives of servicemen living overseas, were tried and convicted
of murder by military court-martial under article 118 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.1 Their trials took place in the countries where they
were living with their husbands. Defendants brought petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code2 authorizing their trials by court-martial. Initially the

164 Stat. 140 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §712. Murder is a capital offense under the
Uniform Code.
2 64 Stat. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §552(11).
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United States Supreme Court rejected this contention.8 On rehearing,
held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The guarantee of the right to jury
trial contained in article 3, section 2, and the guarantees of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments restrict the government no matter where it is acting.
Treaties and executive agreements cannot confer power upon Congress
to provide for court-martial of dependents of military personnel in violation
of the foregoing constitutional guarantees. The exception of "cases arising
in the land and naval forces" to the Fifth Amendment right of indictment
by grand jury does not include civilian dependents of servicemen with
troops overseas, for they are not in the 1and and naval forces, and neither
the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces" 4 nor the necessary and proper clause5 can include them
within the exception.6 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas,
and Brennan comprised the majority. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
concurred separately, refusing in capital cases to hold that dependents
are so closely related to the armed forces as to make trial by court-martial
essential to the effective "government and regulation of the land and naval
forces." Justices Clark and Burton dissented, arguing that the prior hearings correctly decided that the power of Congress to establish legislative
courts outside the United States made court-martial jurisdiction constitutional, and that in any case jurisdiction was constitutional under the power
of Congress "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces." Reid v. Covert; Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
The Court in holding such trials unconstitutional virtually overruled
In re Ross,1 on which the holding in the original hearing had been based.
That case had upheld trial by consular court of a seaman serving on an
American ship for murder of a ship's officer. The rejection and overruling
of that case is not surprising in view of the historical context in which it
arose. The doctrine of extraterritoriality, popular at the turn of the century,
is not accepted as desirable at the present time, 8 and the Court's declaring
it a historical relic9 is in keeping with the modern view. Although the
"Insular Cases," 10 used to buttress the holding in the original hearing, were

3 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). See
comment, 55 MICH. L. REv. 114 (1956).
4 U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 14.
5 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, §8, cl. 18.
6 It was accepted without question by the Court that the exception clause of the
Fifth Amendment applies equally to the provisions of the Sixth Amendment although
not specifically mentioned there. This construction has never been seriously questioned
by -the Court. See Ex -parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. I (1942).
7 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
s The remaining consular courts of the United States were abolisl:ied recently by
Congress. 70 Stat. 773 (1956).
9 Principal case at 12.
10 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). The
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sharply criticized and limited in the principal case, the problem before the
Court in those cases was so entirely different from that before the Court in
the principal case that the rejection of them as not controlling should not
be considered as a rejection of the "fundamental right" doctrine for which
they stand. The language of the opinion11 casts some doubt on the validity
of the doctrine but the cases' relationship to the principal cases is so slight
that it would be unwise to declare those cases overruled by the principal
opinion. Furthur, both of the concurrences and the dissent state that the
doctrine still has validity.12
Trial by court-martial (rather than by the courts of foreign countries)
was authorized in both of the principal cases by executive agreements,13
and it was argued that the power of Congress to implement executive
agreements14 made such court-martial jurisdiction constitutional. By rejecting this argument the Court clarified the relationship between treaties
and executive agreements and the limits on congressional action imposed
by the Constitution. Since Missouri v. Holland 15 this relationship has been
in doubt and this doubt was the propulsive force behind the Bricker
Amendment.16 The holding does not conflict with the decisions in Missouri
v. Holland or two subsequent cases17 dealing with executive agreements,
because in none of those cases was the court faced directly with an international agreement which conflicted with a constitutional guarantee.18 If

Court held that "unincorporated" territories of the United States are not a part of the
Union so that portions of the Constitution do not apply. Persons in those territories
were held to be entitled only to those rights which are fundamental to this country's
system of government, and the right to jury trial is not a fundamental right. The fact
that these territories had entirely different systems of jurisprudence and different customs
from the United States, making rapid conversion to American methods impossible or at
least highly impractical, was the controlling factor in the decisions. Obviously this factor
is not present in the military justice case and the cases should not be applied in this
entirely different situation.
11 Principal case at 14: "Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases nor
their reasoning should be given any further expansion."
12 Principal case at 53, 67, 74, 79.
13 England: Executive Agreement of July 27, 1942, 57 Stat. 1193 (1942); Japan: Administrative Agreement, 3 U.S.T. 3341 (1952). Both agreements provided that United
States service courts would be willing and able to try and punish offenses against the
laws of the foreign nation ,by members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, and their dependents.
H 252 U.S. 416 (1920), holding that legislation implementing a treaty with Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
15 Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code includes langnage indicating specifically that it
is to implement treaties and administrative agreements.
10 See Bricker, "Constitutional Insurance for a Safe Treaty-Making Policy," 60 DICK.
L. R.Ev. 103 (1956).
17 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
18 In the principal case the Court was not forced to strike down legislation as to a
currently operative international agreement as both agreements have been superseded
by treaty provisions which do not specifically provide that service courts will be able to
try offenses against the laws of foreign nations. See NATO Status of Forces ,Agreement,
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this holding is followed in the future it will limit the treaty power to those
areas in which the government is not prohibited from acting.1 0
The keystone of the Court's opinion is the interpretation given to the
phrase "cases arising in the land and naval forces," for if defendants are
not included in this exception to the Fifth Amendment, the necessary and
proper clause cannot remove their right to trial by jury. This was the view
taken in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,20 and the opinion in the
principal case is merely an extension of that doctrine limiting the necessary
and proper clause as it relates to military justice. It can be argued, however, as it was by Justice Reed in his dissent in the Toth case,21 that the
interpretation given to the exception clause of the Fifth Amendment is too
narrow, for the clause refers to cases arising in the land and naval forces
and not to persons in the land and naval forces. Therefore, it should not
be limited to persons actually in the military service, but should embrace
persons closely related to the armed forces, including dependents overseas.
The interpretation of the principal case, 22 making trial of many offenses
by civilian dependents practically impossible, creates many problems for
the armed forces, 23 which lend force to the test proposed by the concurring
justices. Under that test the Court would be able to analyze each case,
much as it analyzes due process cases, to determine whether the method of
trial established by Congress is sufficiently essential to the effective government of the armed forces to outweigh the deprivation to civilians of jury
trial. In light of the varying views of the justices in the principal case it is
difficult to determine the present limits of court-martial jurisdiction of
civilians. While civilian dependents in a capital case clearly cannot be
court-martialled, the Court specifically refrained from indicating the status
of civilian employees of the armed forces overseas. Moreover, the capital

4 U.S.T. 1792 (1953); Amendment of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement
under Article III of the Security Treaty, 4 U.S.T. 1846 (1953). It is interesting to note
that never has a treaty been struck down by the Court as contrary to the Constitution.
In this area the Court is faced with the international problems resulting from the failure
or inability of the nation to live up to its foreign commitments. See CORWIN, THE CoNsrrrurroN OF THE UNITED STATF.S 412-445 (1953); 70 HARv. L. REV. 1043 (1957).
10 Prior to 1900 there were several cases in which appeared dicta that a treaty could
not override •the specific provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco,
11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 616 at 620 (1870); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 211 at 243 (1872):
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 at 267 (1890). Until the principal case, however, such
statements have never been necessary to the decision of a case.
20,350 U.S. 11 (1955). The Court held that a former serviceman who ·had ,been discharged from the service could not be tried by court-martial for crimes committed abroad
during his term of service.
21 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, note 20 supra, at 37.
22 The Court expressed a fear of military control of the civilian population and
of military government. Much the same viewpoint is shown in -the Toth opinion. In
view of these pronouncements it is not surprising to find the justices strictly limiting
the scope of the exception clause.
23 The alternatives to court-martial of dependents are given in the principal case by
Justices Clark and Harlan in their opinions. See principal case at 72 and 86 to 89.
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and non-capital clistinction24 was so clearly defined by Justices Frankfurter25
and Harlan26 that it is not difficult to foresee both men supporting a courtmartial should a non-capital case arise. They would be joined by Justices
Clark and Burton, who support court-martial jurisdiction in any overseas
military dependent case, so the Court would be evenly divided, with Justice
Whittaker in the tie-breaking position. Trials of civilians connected with
the military forces in wartime present an analogous but different problem,
and jurisdiction of courts-martial in that situation is more easily supported
under the war powers of Congress and the President.21 The Toth case and
the principal case have indicated that the Court will rather severely restrict
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. The extent to which it will be
permitted can be determined only by subsequent decisions.28 Since four
justices would make the practicalities of the situation controlling,29 it is
doubtful that military jurisdiction will be much further limited.
Gerald M. Smith

24 This distinction has been used by the Court .before. Compare Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
25 Principal case at 45.
26 Principal case at 65.
27 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S.
l!41 (1952). But see Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. K.ahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946).
28 See generally 55 MICH. L. REV. 114 (1956).
29 Justice Frankfurter, principal case at 44; Justice Harlan, principal case at 75;
Justices Clark and Burton, principal case at 83.

